

ideas of the United Nations' effort led by the leadership of the United States military. We have the facts. We are on the ground. We know the facts.

But, Mr. Speaker, I think it is shameful to note that we have lost more soldiers than when it was announced that the war was over. I think it is shameful that when those soldiers die we are ignoring the fact that we have, in fact, lost our wounded, over 1,104, and that there are wounded individuals every single day that go unreported because of the fact that we are only reporting those who have died.

Mr. Speaker, as I close, let me simply say the poverty rate is going up. We, frankly, need to do this together, keeping the peace, providing for the peace. We will need world friends. It is time now for us to design an aftermath that will provide for democracy and safety in Iraq.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. MORAN) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. MORAN of Kansas addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. WYNN) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. WYNN addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. DOGGETT) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. DOGGETT addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. STRICKLAND) is recognized for 5 minutes.

(Mr. STRICKLAND addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

IRAQ WATCH

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 2003, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. HOFFEL) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the minority leader.

Mr. HOFFEL. Mr. Speaker, the House is back in session this week. And on the first evening back in session, we are resuming the Iraq Watch.

This is an effort that has been going on since late in the spring, primarily by four of us here on the floor of the House, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. DELAHUNT), the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. ABERCROMBIE), and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. EMANUEL), to raise questions about our poli-

cies in Iraq, to suggest corrections in those policies, to ask questions about the diplomacies leading up to military action, to ask questions about the intelligence relating to weapons of mass destruction, the use of that intelligence, the presence and whereabouts and the custody of those weapons of mass destruction, fundamentally questions about whether we are winning the peace and what exit strategy we have and when we will turn Iraq back to the Iraqis.

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I know my colleagues have a lot of things to say tonight because a lot has been happening since we were last in session, and much of it bad, in Iraq, and we all have our own focus we would like to put on the debate this evening.

I am going to open up and ask some questions focused on the fundamental issue of credibility, and I am then going to turn to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. EMANUEL) who has a conflicting time commitment, if my colleagues will agree, for the points that he would like to make in just a few minutes.

There are so many unanswered questions about credibility relating to our actions in Iraq. Why did the White House press the CIA to approve misleading language in the State of the Union, suggesting that Hussein was uranium shopping throughout Africa, when the White House knew that that information was not accurate? Why did the administration hype alleged strong ties between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda, although those ties have never been established? Why did the White House exaggerate the threat of the weapons of mass destruction themselves and hype both the nature of those weapons and the urgency of the danger caused by those weapons?

The real threat that I see posed by Hussein, who was clearly a murderous tyrant who used weapons of mass destruction in the past against innocent civilians, the real threat was his potential to restart those weapons of mass destruction programs, including the ability and perhaps the desire on his part to restart or even purchase nuclear weapons if the international community lost its focus, if the focus and pressure for resumption of international inspections were to have been set aside, or if sanctions were lifted or if we simply lost interest. That was the threat from Saddam Hussein.

Why did President Bush not stick to that? Why did he exaggerate the threat caused by weapons of mass destruction and these other alleged ties that have not come to pass? We know now that these claims by the administration were exaggerated.

Last fall, in the lead-up to the congressional vote, the administration publicly and privately stated with complete certainty that Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, that he was seeking more; that his chemical and biological and nuclear programs were

well underway; that there were ties between al Qaeda and Hussein; that he had these weapons, he was trying to get more and he was likely to give them away to terrorists. Now we know from declassified intelligence documents that at this very same time the administration was being told by our intelligence agencies that there was a great deal of uncertainty about the status of the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

The Defense Intelligence Agency report of September 2002 and the national intelligence estimate of October 2002 raised serious doubts about this, used phrases like no credible evidence of an Iraqi chemical weapon program. Yet the administration publicly and privately said it is a sure thing, we count on it, we have got to stop it.

Does this matter? Maybe this is the question that we need to address. Does this pattern of deception matter? Do the ends not justify the means? Should we not all be rejoicing that Saddam Hussein is out of power?

I think this pattern of deception does matter because the administration's credibility is shot as a result of this, and when the administration's credibility is shot, our national credibility is threatened. It matters when a government uses deception to try to achieve its goals because that deception can become a habit. It can be habit forming and we reach a point where the government loses its credibility and its moral stature.

The administration oversold the need for war. They oversold the prospects of winning the peace. They oversimplified the challenge of bringing liberty and democracy to Iraq, all the while insisting that we could do this on our own unilaterally, without the help of our traditional alliance, the Western alliances, and in the international community, willingly proclaiming all this time that the U.S. and Britain should be known as the occupying powers, the occupying powers in Iraq, and ignoring the international institutions and the assets they can bring to bear to help a people become a free people and develop democratic institutions. It is time for the administration to level with the American people, to stop this pattern of deception that undermines the work we are trying to achieve.

The President should answer seven questions. The first is he should tell us how long the military occupation is going to take, how long will it last.

Secondly, how much will the military occupation cost? The current estimates are \$1 billion a week, \$4 billion a month, to maintain our military occupation.

Thirdly, how long is the reconstruction going to take?

Fourthly, how much will that cost? Most estimates I have seen, \$20 billion a year for at least 5 years. That is \$100 billion to reconstruct Iraq.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOFFEL. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.